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From the Law to the Decision: The Social and Legal
Conditions of Asylum Adjudication in Switzerland
Jonathan Miaz
Starting from an ethnography within the State Secretariat for Migrations in Switzerland, this article
addresses the issue of discretion in law enforcement by analyzing the conditions in which Swiss
asylum caseworkers make their decision. This article argues that social and legal constraints frame
caseworkers’ practices and favor a strict interpretation of the law when implementing it. If evolu-
tions of legislation have indeed strengthened the law, there are also incentives for strictness through
the controls of superiors and peers, as well as through the secondary implementation rules created
within the office to orient caseworkers’ practices. Nevertheless, this article also shows that the posi-
tion of the individual caseworkers in the institution, their institutional symbolic capital, the role of
their superiors, the group pressure they experience, the countries from which the asylum demands
they process originate, as well as caseworkers’ institutional socialization, structure their perception
of the room for maneuver they can exercise.
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从法律到决定: 瑞士庇护审判的社会情况和法律情况
本文从瑞士国家移民事务秘书处 (State Secretariat for Migrations) 中的民族志出发, 分析了负责
处理庇护事务的个案工作者在做决定时的情况, 从而处理了执法部门的自由裁量权问题。本文
主张,社会限制和法律限制会形成个案工作者的实践,并在实施法律时偏向严格执行。如果立法
的发展过程确实强化了法律,那么同时也会鼓励严格管制上级和同辈,同样也会对政府部门内创
建“次要实施规则” (secondary implementation rules) 的严肃性产生激励作用, 进而确定个案工作
者的实践方向。尽管如此,本文还展示了影响个案工作者感知实践可操作空间的几个方面,它们
分别是:个案工作者在机构内的职位、机构的象征资本、个案工作者上级扮演的角色、承受的
团队压力、发出庇护需求的国家、以及个案工作者的制度性社会化 (institutional socialization)。
关键词: 庇护政策, 街头官僚(基层官僚), 法律与社会, 自由裁量权, 政策民族志
De la ley a la decision: Las condiciones legales y sociales de la adjudicacion de
asilo en Suiza
Empezando con la etnografıa dentro de la Secretarıa de Estado para la Migracion en Suiza, este
artıculo aborda el problema de la discrecion en las autoridades al analizar las condiciones en que los
asistentes sociales para el asilo toman su decision. Este artıculo sostiene que los lımites legales y
sociales enmarcan las practicas de los asistentes sociales y favorecen una interpretacion estricta de la
ley cuando se implementa. Si las evoluciones de la legislacion han realmente fortalecido la ley, hay
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tambien incentivos para ser estrictos a traves de los controles de los superiores y compa~neros, ası
como a traves de las reglas de implementacion secundaria creadas dentro de la oficina para orientar
las practicas de los asistentes sociales. Sin embargo, este artıculo tambien muestra que la posicion de
los asistentes sociales individuales dentro de la institucion, su capital simbolico institucional, el
papel de sus superiores, la presion del grupo que ellos sufren, los paıses de los que vienen las peticio-
nes de asilo en las que trabajan, ası como la socializacion institucional de los asistentes sociales,
estructuran su percepcion del espacio de maniobrar que ellos pueden ejercer.
PALABRAS CLAVES: Polıtica de asilo, burocracia a nivel de la calle, ley y sociedad, discrecion, etno-
grafıa polıtica
Introduction
I conducted an interview with Corinna B.,1 a 31-year old asylum case-
worker working at the Headquarter of the State Secretariat for Migrations.
She comments on the decision she will take about two brothers from a
Balkan country.
Corinna B.: I must render a decision to dismiss the application without
entering into the substance of the case (DAWES),2 even if, like this morn-
ing, the people are very nice. And I even believe that these men could
work here, because they already speak the language and they actually
want to work for a good reason. They have problems there [in their
homeland]. I wish they could stay. But I can’t. I must stick to the law.
(Interview with Corinna B., December 2011, translated from French)
Caseworkers may at times perceive that they have room for maneuver during
the decision making process they engage in when reviewing cases. However,
under certain conditions, they also feel bound by the rules of law, as well as
accountable for the laws they have to apply. In the body of literature on street-
level bureaucracy, there are many discussions about the continuation, or on the
contrary, the curtailment of discretion that would characterize the work of street-
level bureaucrats at the frontlines (Evans & Harris, 2004). Indeed, discretion is a
key issue and a key concept in the study of street-level bureaucracy (Hupe, 2013;
Hupe, Hill & Buffat, 2015; Lipsky, 2010) and in the sociology of law (Delpeuch,
Dumoulin & De Galembert, 2014). Some research and discussions about the con-
tinuation or curtailment of discretion among street-level bureaucracies seem to
assume a binary alternative between discretion and rule-following (Evans & Har-
ris, 2004; Oberfield, 2010), or even between discretion and law, as Anna Pratt
pointed it out (Pratt, 1999). However, observing practices and listening to case-
workers allow us to go beyond this binary juxtaposition between discretion and
rule-following.
In this article, I tackle the issue of discretion in another way. I start from
the statement that, in certain situations and conditions, caseworkers can experience
themselves as having certain and limited room for maneuver in the decision
Miaz: From the Law to the Decision: Policy Studies Journal 373
making process, but that they also feel bound by the rules and accountable for
the law they have to apply. Thus, very often, caseworkers act in conformity
with the institutional prescriptions and expectations, and do not perceive any
room for maneuver. This leads me to question the social conditions of both the
use of room for maneuver and the conformity of the adjudication practices to
institutional prescriptions and expectations. Thus, this article aims to answer
three questions:
First, how do Swiss asylum caseworkers make their decisions? This question
is designed to investigate whether Swiss asylum caseworkers can have a procedu-
ral discretion in their practices and therefore perceive they can use room for
maneuver in applying asylum law at specific junctures. Nevertheless, Swiss asy-
lum caseworkers also claim that they only “implement” or “apply the law”, and
that they feel bound by the rules, prescriptions, and expectations of the institution
in which they work, despite a relative diversity in the profiles and role concep-
tions of the caseworkers.
Second, I ask: to which extent do they act in conformity with the institutional
prescriptions and expectations? With this question, I would like to underline and
question whether caseworkers actually act in accordance or conformity with their
colleagues and with the institution, despite the relative diversity underlined earlier.
Based on data, I argue that there are different social and legal constraints and mech-
anisms, which frame and guide the practices of the caseworkers and, finally, their
perceptions and their uses of room for maneuver. To some extent, they have internal-
ized a certain institutional logic, which they then reproduce in their practices.
My third question is: under which conditions and in which situations do they
perceive and use room for maneuver? I argue that Swiss asylum caseworkers can
perceive and use their room for maneuver to issue a decision which can run coun-
ter to the institutional prescriptions and expectations. This perception is strongly
related to asylum caseworker’s institutional and legal capital, to his/her concep-
tion of his/her role, and to his/her position in the institution.
To summarize, I reveal the specific conditions under which Swiss asylum
caseworkers perceive and use room for maneuver in their work, even though their
institution strongly frames their daily practices. As a matter of fact, caseworkers
very often act in conformity with institutional prescriptions and expectations,
because they have partly internalized and co-produced them. This state of things
underlines legal and social constraints in the use of a room for maneuver that
tends to standardize the practices of caseworkers. The motives told by the asylum
seekers during the interview, caseworkers’ legal and institutional capital—this lat-
ter can refer to the institutional experience and responsibilities, legal and practical
skills, the position within the institution, etc.—their conception of both their role
and that of the asylum, their superiors who control their decisions, the specific
“secondary implementation rules” defined by the institution toward the country
of origin of the asylum seekers, as well as other social relations (group pressure
within the section in which caseworkers work, the threat of a recourse, etc.), all
shape their uses and implementation of the law in specific cases.
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Theoretical Discussion
A part of the literature about discretion assumes an alternative between dis-
cretion and rule-following (Evans & Harris, 2004; Oberfield, 2010). Anna C. Pratt
underlined well that debates about discretion have long been limited by the false
discretion/law binary which imagines a clear distinction between those two:
“where law ends, discretion begins” (Pratt, 1999, p. 217). Such a conception runs
the danger of ignoring the labor of interpretation and the actual uses of the rules
by the actors in question. However, studying these concrete uses leads me to state
that social actors generally play with the rules (Lascoumes & Le Bourhis, 1996),
remaining most often within the rules—i.e., respecting the rules. Actors face con-
crete individuals to whom they have to apply the rules, which they interpret
according to those specific situations. This is especially true for the asylum case-
workers who are charged with making administrative decisions argued “in law”
(“de jure”). This characteristic differentiates them from the street-level bureaucrats
commonly studied, such as social or welfare workers, teachers, or police officers
(Brodkin, 2011a,b; Buffat, 2015; Dubois, 2010; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003;
Oberfield, 2014; Smith, 2003; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). In that sense, Swiss asylum
caseworkers are closer to judges. I will nevertheless show that the approach in
terms of street-level bureaucracy first elaborated by Lipsky (1980) is particularly
relevant to understand the asylum administration and how its bureaucrats work
on a daily basis.
In my work, I consider law as a “social activity” (Lascoumes & Serverin,
1988) and use a constitutive approach which “serves to focus attention on the
way in which law is implicated in social practices, as an always potentially pre-
sent dimension of social relations, while at the same time reminding us that law
is itself the product of the play and struggle of social relations” (Hunt, 1993, 3).
With this perspective, I aim to analyze law through its uses and through its social
conditions of realization (Dubois, 2009a; Dubois, Dulong, Buton & Chambolle,
2003), which leads me to go beyond the distinction between discretion and
rule-following.
Indeed, interpreting rules inevitably involves a room for maneuver (Voutat,
2009), as Ronald Dworkin puts it in his famous metaphor of the doughnut:
The concept of discretion is at home in only one sort of context; when
someone is in general charged with making decisions subject to standards
set by a particular authority. Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does
not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It
is therefore a relative concept. It always makes sense to ask, ‘Discretion
under which standards? (Dworkin, 1978, p. 31)
But as Keith Hawkins (quoting Denis Galligan) notes, this metaphor should
not lead us to believe that the distinction between discretion and its surrounding
standards is clear (Hawkins, 1992, p. 14). Building on his remark, I argue that, in
some cases—as for the Asylum Act and the characterization of specific asylum
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motives and situations “in law”—rules and standards are not always clear and
leave room for interpretation. Moreover, asylum caseworkers can choose to sup-
port their decision with certain rules of law and not others.
Peter Hupe shows that discretion is a key concept in legal studies as well as
in the street-level bureaucracy studies (Hupe, 2013). Quoting Keith Hawkins
(Hawkins, 1992) and Ronald Dworkin (Dworkin, 1978), Peter Hupe explains that,
in a juridical perspective, discretion is inherent to the implementation of law. In
Keith Hawkins’ words:
Discretion is a central and inevitable part of the legal order. It is central to
law because contemporary legal systems have come increasingly to rely
on express grants of authority to legal and administrative officials to
attain broad legislative purposes. It is inevitable because the translation of
rule into action, the process by which abstraction becomes actuality,
involves people interpretation and choice. Law is fundamentally an inter-
pretative enterprise in which discretionary behavior is compelled by what
Denis Galligan has neatly summarized as the “vagaries of language, the
diversity of circumstances, and the indeterminacy of official purposes”
[. . .3 ].
Discretion is the means by which law—the most consequential normative
system in a society—is translated into action. (Hawkins, 1992, p. 11)
In this juridical view, discretion is set in legal rules; it is inherent to the imple-
mentation work and to the translation of a rule into an action. In the (Swiss) asy-
lum case, caseworkers translate situations according to rules of law—legally
characterizing the cases. In doing so, they use rules of law to characterize situa-
tions, interpreting both situations and rules. Thus, rules do not merely frame case-
workers’ practices; caseworkers also use and interpret them depending on the
situation.
Peter Hupe also shows that discretion in street-level bureaucracy research
does not hold a uniform meaning. After having discussed a range of different
meanings and the various strands of research tackling this issue, he gives the
following definition of discretion:
When the term rules is reserved for action prescriptions from a formal
rule maker, discretion can be seen as granted freedom to act within limits
prescribed in a given set of rules. Discretionary authority is the freedom
to act within prescribed limits, as granted by a legitimate rule maker. As
such this authority may be exercised by a variety of actors, on a range of
layers; it is not a prerogative of the individual public servant at the street-
level. In contrast to discretion as described in rules, the way freedom is
used refers to actual behavior of actors. (Hupe, 2013, p. 435)
Aurelien Buffat (2015) underlines two main dimensions in different definitions
of the bureaucratic discretion in the literature. First, the notion of bureaucratic
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discretion implies that administrative actors can make choices; meaning they can
take decisions autonomously, grounded in their own judgment and interpretation.
Second, bureaucratic discretion is always related to a normative context consti-
tuted by both formal and informal rules. In that sense, he explains, discretion does
not mean that actors are completely free to do what they want without any con-
straint. Rules and discretion are then two closely related dimensions.
Starting from these considerations and from the idea that room for maneuver
is inherent to the application of law, I take here a relational approach of discre-
tion. This approach is defined not only by the rules contained in the Law (the
Asylum Act in this case) but also shaped by the secondary implementation rules
and other informal rules existing within the organization, as well as social and
organizational constraints. Such constraints include institutional prescriptions and
expectations, as well as controls and evaluations of the practices and decisions by
supervisors and colleagues. This approach is relational because it takes into
account the configuration in which a caseworker works and according to which
he or she either does or does not perceive room for maneuver. In this regard, my
analysis is close to Vincent Dubois’ work on the sociopolitical conditions of legal
rigor (Dubois, 2005; Dubois et al., 2003).
In this article, discretion is understood as power—a discretionary power—to
act or decide within a certain normative context, meaning within the parameters
of certain formal and informal rules (legal constraints), and within certain social
and organizational constraints. I will mainly speak about two different types of
discretion: decisional discretion—which concerns the choice of issuing a decision
on an asylum plea—and procedural discretion—which is related to choices made
during an investigation of a case which can have great influence on decisions and,
consequently, on lives of asylum seekers. To the extent that these two kinds of
discretion are different, they are, nevertheless, closely interrelated. They both are
types of discretionary power, because caseworkers have, in certain limited circum-
stances, this power to choose to do something or not during the investigation and
to decide one way or another. Nevertheless, this relational approach shows that
there are important legal, social, and institutional constraints and logics which ori-
ent caseworkers’ practices and decisions and which limit their perceived room for
maneuver. In this case study, discretion appears to be tightly limited by all these
constraints and logics.
Thus, I ask both what makes caseworker perceive and use a room of maneu-
ver and what makes them act more or less “the same way” as their colleagues?
Thus, my question addresses both the conformity to the institutional prescriptions
and expectations and the uses of discretion. To go further, I question uses of dis-
cretion and of the rules in the Swiss asylum adjudication by focusing on the con-
straints and conditions which guide decisions on specific cases. The broader aim
of this article was to analyze the social conditions under which asylum casework-
ers make their decisions, and how they perceive and use room for maneuver.
I contend that it is important for us to question whether and how caseworkers
actually act in accordance or conformity with their colleagues and with the institu-
tion, despite the heterogeneousness of their profiles and conceptions of their role.
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The example of Corinna—quoted in the beginning of this article—who explains
that she would like to award status (temporary admission or asylum) to the two
asylum seekers she interviewed, but then says she finally feels obliged by the
rules to take a DAWES—which is probably the worst decision to receive for an
asylum seeker—gives insight about how the use of discretion is subject to condi-
tions. Moreover, beyond the case of Corinna, it is interesting to examine how deci-
sions become “obvious” for caseworkers. Thus, after having discussed the
heterogeneousness of the practices, I will show that there is a social configuration
and social conditions which frame and direct the practices of the caseworkers
and, finally, their perceptions and their uses of discretion. Thus, actors sometimes
act “as they ought” without having concrete reasons to explain their decisions; they
are following the pre-established ways of doing and thinking, which are external
to them and are not dependent upon what they think about it (Mariot, 2012).
In this paper, I will then link the questions of discretion and of conformity.
Considering discretion as inherent to implementation of the law, what ends up
being perceived as conformity is also an aspect of making a discretionary
judgment, even if it is not perceived as such by the actors. Decisions that deviate
from the institutional expectations and prescriptions can be costlier than those that
conform. We will also see that the perception of the possibility to make those
decisions is related to certain conditions.
Methods and Data
This article is based on a policy ethnography (Belorgey, 2012; Dubois, 2009b,
2015; Schatz, 2009) conducted between 2010 and 2014, and involved long-term
immersion in different fields and with various actors of the Asylum Act. During
this project, I had three fieldsites and conducted interviews with employees of the
SEM and with lawyers in legal defense services for migrants. My fieldsites were:
1. A reception center of the State Secretariat for Migrations (SEM)4 between
October 2010 and February 2011. I observed interviews of asylum seekers by
SEM agents, and I also conducted 13 semi-directive interviews with SEM
asylum caseworkers and their superiors.
2. The central office of the State Secretariat for Migrations, from September
2011 to February 2012. I was situated within the department responsible for
the asylum procedure and, at that time, for the issues of return as well. I
could observe the interviews of the asylum seekers by the SEM officers. I
observed how they work, and I attended trainings, department, and section
meetings. I conducted 46 interviews with asylum caseworkers and their
superiors.
3. Legal Assistance Service for Migrants in a city of the French-speaking part of
Switzerland, where I conducted participant observation from February 2011 to
August 2011. I augmented this fieldsite experience with a 1-week observation
in another service of another city and canton. In 2013, I also conducted 20
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interviews with legal assistants and lawyers who are engaged in the legal
defense of asylum seekers in Switzerland.5
Thus, my research focuses on the social uses of the law by the SEM, by the
legal services for asylum seekers, and by the Federal Administrative Court (FAC)
—where I conducted a short complementary enquiry through interviews and
jurisprudence analysis—and on interactions between these actors. Like other
researchers who have studied the immigration or asylum policy implementation
(Alpes & Spire, 2014; Darley, 2010, 2014; Eule, 2014; Fassin & Kobelinsky, 2012;
Fresia, Bozzini & Sala, 2013; Gill, 2016; Good, 2007; Infantino & Rea, 2012; Jubany,
2011; Kobelinsky, 2013; Lahusen & Schneider, 2016; Lawrance & Ruffer, 2014;
Schoenholtz, Schrag & Ramji-Nogales, 2014; Thomas, 2011), I analyze the concrete
practices of officials within the SEM with a perspective interested both in the
administration and in other actors such as legal services and FAC. Nevertheless,
this article is mainly based on the research conducted in the two fieldsites located
within the State Secretariat for Migrations (SEM).
The Social Conditions of Asylum Adjudication
To analyze the social conditions of the asylum adjudication, I will start with a
description of the evolution of the Swiss asylum policy and of the Asylum Act.
This evolution is characterized by an increasing suspicion of the asylum seekers
and by a sophistication and hardenings of the Asylum Act. The asylum policy
evolution and the asylum adjudication are characterized by an important tension
between this suspicion and a will to limit the immigration on the one hand, and a
humanitarian and human rights dimension which favors asylum on the other
hand. After reviewing these contextual elements, I will present the conditions in
which asylum caseworkers can perceive and use room for maneuver, and how
social and institutional constraints frame their practices—making them act in con-
formity with the institutional prescriptions and expectations, and limiting their
perception and use of discretion.
Sophistication and Hardening of Swiss Asylum Act
In Switzerland, since the Asylum Act became effective in 1981, the asylum
issue has become recurrent in political debates. Since then, we have seen an
increase in the number of rules (juridification) or, in other words, the sophistication
of the law (Miaz, 2017) as it has been revised several times. This evolution of the
law has been driven by two main goals: to accelerate the procedures and treat-
ment of the application for asylum and to “fight the abuses”. This latter objective
based on the polemics about “false refugees” and the “abuses”—which constitute
the main frames of the asylum issue—led to a securitization (Bigo, 2002) of asy-
lum and introduced a perspective of promoting a greater control on the demands.
This evolution is important for the daily work of asylum caseworkers. Their
work is characterized by the systematic suspicion of the asylum seekers and the
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truthfulness of their story, like it has been observed in other European countries
(Eule, 2014; Fassin, 2013; Fassin et al., 2015; Fassin & Kobelinsky, 2012; Jubany,
2011; Kelly, 2012; Kobelinsky, 2013; Probst, 2011, 2012; Souter, 2011). Suspicion
and disbelief have become institutional practices which frame the asylum case-
work. More generally, these changes of the asylum policy contributed to its hard-
ening. The following evolutions can be observed:
1. The adoption of measures accelerating the case processing;
2. The adoption of coercive measures (to force the migrants whose asylum
demands have been rejected to return to their country of origin);
3. The increase in the motives of inadmissibility of the applications, in the cir-
cumstances leading to a negative decision, in the requirements to prove the
credibility of the persecutions, and in the obstacles to appealing;
4. The adoption of “dissuasive measures” to come and stay in Switzerland;
5. The development of a discourse on “struggle against abuses”;
6. A convergence with the dispositions implemented by the European Union (in
particularly with the Dublin Convention);
7. The implementation of an active “Return Assistance” program in order to
stimulate the “voluntary returns” (Parini, 1997; Parini & Gianni, 2005; Piguet,
2009; Tafelmacher, 2013).
Another characteristic of the asylum policy changes is the sophistication of the
asylum law. The term of sophistication refers here to the process through which
the legal frame evolves toward a greater complexity, implying a greater number
of interrelated legal texts and normative levels, an advanced degree of (technical)
drafting, and an important specification of the law according to the motivations of
the asylum seekers and to the countries of origin. This process is closely related
both to the important politicization of the asylum issue in Switzerland, implying
several revisions of the Asylum Act in the Parliament and through referendums,
and to the important judicialization of the administrative decisions at the federal
level to the Federal Administrative Court (Byland & Varone, 2012; Tanquerel, Var-
one, Bolkensteyn & Byland, 2011).
Thus, the law is not only more and more complex and changing but it is also
more and more specified according to very specific individual motives and situa-
tions understood and analyzed in relation with specific countries of origin. The
asylum caseworkers’ work is then significantly framed by the law and by sec-
ondary implementation rules (Lascoumes 1990), which are supposed to guide
caseworkers in the investigation and in the decision making of cases. These sec-
ondary implementation rules—Asylpraxis or “APPA”—are more or less formalized
by country. They are elaborated by SEM agents (caseworkers and superiors) and
approved by the hierarchy. They present the guidelines for investigation of and
decision making on the asylum demands. They aggregate “profiles” from different
elements to consider in the examination of the asylum pleas. These rules are very
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important because they instruct on how to deal with an asylum plea from a speci-
fic country with specific motives.
In the Swiss asylum procedure, asylum seekers are usually interviewed two
times. The first hearing is about the personal data (name, surname, date of birth,
sex, religion, ethnic group/tribe/etc., country of origin, family, and—briefly—
about the motivation for seeking asylum). During the second hearing, asylum
caseworkers question the asylum seekers on their motivation in a more detailed
manner. These interviews and their confrontation with other means of proof will
be the basis for a decision. Caseworkers can ask for other documentation (medical
report, query to the embassy, country expertise, linguistic report, etc.). Then they
have to determine whether the asylum seekers meet the criteria for refugee
according to the article 3 of the asylum act (AsylA).
Refugees are persons who in their native country or in their country of
last residence are subject to serious disadvantages or have a well-founded
fear of being exposed to such disadvantages for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or due to their per-
sonal opinions. (Art. 3, al.1 AsylA)
Caseworkers must decide whether motivations in question are relevant
according to the article 3 AsylA—and whether the asylum seekers have given
enough “credible” proofs6 to be considered as refugees—according to the article 7
of the AsylA. After this first decision, they must decide if the return is demand-
able, lawful, and possible. If not, the asylum seekers can receive a subsidiary pro-
tection through a temporary admission (TA).
Thus, the asylum caseworkers have several possibilities:
1. (until 2014) a decision of dismissing the application without engaging with the
substance of the case (DAWES),7 which is a decision of non-admissibility (for
various reasons) of the demand (some cases unfold in such a way that the asy-
lum seekers do not get a second hearing);
2. a negative decision (reject)—in this case the expulsion is ordered;
3. if the expulsion or the return is not “possible”,8 not “permitted”,9 or not “rea-
sonable”,10 the asylum seekers obtain a F permit, a temporary admission;
4. the recognition of the criteria for a refugee.
The following figure shows the proportion of decision per type between 200911
and 2015 (Figure 1). It shows that between 20% and 40% of decisions were those of
DAWES related to the Dublin Agreements, allowing to expulse the asylum seekers
to another country of the Dublin Space. Before 2014, the addition of decisions giving
asylum or a temporary admission did not exceed 40% of the decisions, remaining
between a minimum of 18.8% in 2012 and 37.2% in 2010. The proportion of DAWES
without temporary admission was significant until 2013 (between 14.2% and 25.5%
of the decisions). This significant proportion of DAWES is also related to the context
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and flow of the asylum demands and to the priorities of treatment established by
the SEM to manage a significant flow of asylum seekers. Thus, since 2011, the num-
ber of new asylum demands has increased from 15,567 in 2010 to 22,551 in 2011 and
28,631 in 2012. With the “asylum crisis”, the number of new asylum demands
increased to 39,523 in 2015. In 2011 and 2012, the SEM reacted to this increase by
adjusting processing priorities. These processing priorities asked the caseworkers to
make more decisions for cases that could be easily sent back, in order to “empty/
free the beds”12 in asylum seekers centers (federal and cantonal ones).
As I explained, while the law imposes some constraints, its interpretation can
leave a relatively wide room for maneuver. According to my analysis, secondary
implementation rules and the institutional prescriptions about the interpretation
and the application of the law strengthen the framing of the asylum caseworkers’
decision making. We can then observe a collective normative power, or to use
another term, an organizational power to interpret and create norms, in collec-
tively constructing these secondary implementation norms and in establishing
organizational prescriptions (priorities and strategies of treatment). The context of
asylum flow as well as the political evolution of the asylum issue in Switzerland
also frame the conditions in which Swiss asylum caseworkers work and imple-
ment the law.
Procedural Discretion and Policy-making Issue
Observing the asylum caseworkers in the State Secretariat for Migration
(SEM) shows that there are differences in the ways they “play” their role during
the interviews and their investigations of the files. These differences can be inter-
preted according to SEM agents’ conceptions of their role. While Sylvie—who has
been an asylum caseworker for more than 10 years in the SEM—explains that she
lets the asylum seekers speak and then tries to ask questions to test the plausibil-
ity of the story, other caseworkers directly confront the asylum seekers with their
potential contradictions. The way caseworkers look for inconsistencies and
Figure 1. Proportion of decisions per type of decision (2009–2015).
Source: Statistics of the SEM.
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contradictions, as well as the way they interpret them, can vary to a great extent.
During my fieldwork, I observed different attitudes during the interviews: show-
ing anger, being emotionless or empathetic, etc.
The caseworkers also have different ways of interviewing asylum seekers and
of investigating the cases. They can dominate the conversation with precise ques-
tions or let someone speak. They can dwell on the inconsistencies and contradic-
tions, or ignore them. Some of them increase the investigation measures—whether
to strengthen their conviction in their decision, or to prove a lie in the story—
while others only base their decisions on the interviews. I also observed that they
sometimes wait to make a decision (which can be in the interest of the asylum
seeker) or that they give the priority to certain cases. If these attitudes vary
according to the caseworkers, these elements can finally have an impact on the
final decision. This demonstrates that caseworkers have an important “procedural
discretion” (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010), which may have a great importance for
asylum seekers and for their individual cases. According to Evelyn Z. Brodkin
and Malaj Majmundar,
Caseworkers exercise what we term procedural discretion when
they demand face-to-face meetings beyond those required by regula-
tion, set appointment times without regard to claimant circumstances
(such as pickup schedules for school children), or schedule multiple
claimants simultaneously, producing long waiting times at welfare
offices. (Brodkin & Majmundar, 2010, p. 831)
This procedural discretion can have an important impact on the final decision
and, consequently, for the individual migrants, on themselves. First, the choices
made by caseworkers during the investigation sometimes have consequences on
their decision. Two opposite trends illustrate this point. On the one hand, some
caseworkers ask many questions during hearings and amplify means of investiga-
tion to track sings of incredibility, while some of their colleagues believe that a
“reasonable doubt” should benefit the asylum seeker. They can also try to show
that the person is not a minor or does not come from the alleged country of ori-
gin. On the other hand, for some cases, certain caseworkers will try to look if
there are conditions and arguments to give a temporary admission, while some of
their colleagues will not do this effort. They can use means of investigation to
have sufficient elements to defend this decision toward their supervisors. These
two examples show how procedural discretion can, under certain circumstances,
have an impact on the final decision.
Second, the choices made by caseworkers during investigations sometimes have
consequences on life conditions of asylum seekers themselves. On the one hand,
some asylum caseworkers will try to find means to send someone’s back to his or
her country of origin as soon as possible, rendering a very fast decision and organiz-
ing a return. On the other hand, other caseworkers can take more time to give their
decision, which allow asylum seekers a (short) time to stay in Switzerland.
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This procedural discretion shows that asylum caseworkers and their superiors
are “policymakers”, as Michael Lipsky meant it (Lipsky, 1980), in the sense that
they give concrete expression to the law and policy. They interpret the story told
by the migrants according to the law. Thus, to rephrase Alexis Spire, they make a
constant work of production, appropriation, and re-interpretation of the rules and
of the stories. As such, they play a central role as nodes of translation of the rules
(Spire, 2005, 11).
Some of them are also “policymakers” and law producers, in the sense that they
are involved in the elaboration of secondary implementation rules—which are insti-
tutional rules and practices interpreting the law for specific countries and motives.
The practice over gender-related persecutions is one of the rare examples of an evo-
lution through an opening of the refugee definition. In Switzerland, this change
came “from below” through the work of individual caseworkers. But this evolution
from below should not be reduced to this level of analysis, seeing that it has been
made possible owing to conditions of feasibility at the national and international
levels (Miaz, 2014). This short example underlines that some policy changes can
come from below, even if the general practices trend toward the hardening of the
asylum policy and the institutional culture of suspicion and disbelief.
Nevertheless, in recognizing that caseworkers can have discretion, especially
procedural discretion, I would like to underline how the institution shapes their
individual practices.
Juridism of Position
Although some caseworkers acknowledge they sometimes have a certain
room for maneuver, they also state that such room is relatively limited. Then, they
tend to insist on a certain rigor in the rules’ application, self-identifying with no
other role except that of “executant”.13 This legalistic attitude is related to the idea
that they are bound to “apply the law”, as per Corinna’s quote at the beginning
of this paper shows. This attitude can be linked to what Vincent Dubois calls “jur-
idism of position” (Dubois, 2005, 2009a)14 or a “legalist ethos”. This juridism has
here a double function of keeping a distance: first with regard to the emotional
dimension of their work, which confronts them with human misery through a
strongly asymmetrical relation; and secondly with regard to the political dimen-
sion of their work. When I ask Pierre V., asylum caseworker since 1998, about this
political dimension, he avoids answering my questions about the evolution of the
Swiss asylum policy and repeats that he is just an executant of the parliamentary
and popular will. His words illustrate this distant attitude toward the emotional
and political dimensions of his job.
Jonathan:
How would you describe the changes that occurred since you have been here?
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Pierre V.:
The members of Parliament decide and we apply. That’s all. That said, some
people say that the law has been hardened. Others say that the law has not
been hardened enough. . .
Jonathan:
What do you notice?
Pierre V.:
I notice that. . . I simply must apply the law. Full stop. That’s the link. That’s a
part of my job, no matter how is the law. It’s a part of my daily activity. I
leave this discussion to the public and to the members of the Parliament.
That’s all. (Interview with Pierre V., January 2011, translated from French)
Juridism of position allows falling back on the “force” of the law (Bourdieu
1987) adopted by the “People” to justify decisions that they sometimes would pre-
fer not to take. This tension creates difficulties for some caseworkers, who can
experience pangs of conscience when their “moral subjectivity”15 is in contradic-
tion with the “moral economy”16 of the institution (Fassin et al. 2015).
Christophe J., 30 years old, explains that he can sometimes experience pain
because of his convictions and that he has to “keep it to himself”. Speaking about
these moral difficulties, he directly specifies he respects the law and what his
hierarchy prescribes:
Christophe J.:
But I respect the frame, which is here. . . when I come at work, I take off my
ideas and I respect the rules and the job I’m doing. (Interview with Christophe
J., February 2011, translated from French)
That is exactly what Corinna B. also explains in the excerpt in the begin-
ning of the paper. She refers to the law and the equality of treatment she has
to ensure. This juridism shows how institutional socialization leads asylum
caseworkers to internalize a certain institutional logic based on suspicion and
disbelief. Those who could have moral conundrums can stand behind the argu-
ment according to which the law is legitimate, because it has been adopted by
“the People”. Thus, applying the law implies that if one wants to give asylum
“to those who deserve it”, it has to be refused to those who do not fit with
its definition.
The logic of suspicion finds its justification (or counterpart) with the “humani-
tarian” side of asylum: to protect people who are persecuted. That is what Stepha-
nie G., 33 years old, expresses:
Jonathan:
And you told me, that it denatures your role. But what would be your role?
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Stephanie G.:
To give asylum for political motives. Because asylum is political at the basis.
Not economical. But now, yes, there are economic migrants, and there will be
ecological refugees soon. So, it must be revised, everything has to be revised.
Asylum Act has to be revised regarding these new refugees. But now,
economic migrants can receive a temporary admission, because we cannot
send them back, because they are in too great of a distress in their country. Or
for medical cases. Thus, there is a small opening of the Asylum Act, which is
not exclusively reserved to people who have been politically persecuted.
(Interview with Stephanie G., January 2011, translated from French)
In the discourses of SEM agents about the asylum policy and their own role,
rigorous attitudes and juridism seem to be a necessary condition “to give protec-
tion to those who deserve it”. Juridism of position is all the more internalized as
the agents can adhere if not to the whole asylum policy, then at least to one of its
key elements (protection). Caseworkers have internalized perception schemes
where the law appears to be necessary and legitimate. Even if the law is consid-
ered as “too strict” or “bad” by some of them, law appears as a “lesser evil” that
allows workers like Stephanie G. to give asylum and temporary admission, even
if it means to refuse the most part of the asylum seekers. At this step, the impor-
tance of the institutional socialization has to be underlined.
The Force of Secondary Implementation Rules
Asylum decisions have to be countersigned by the caseworker and his or her
superior. This double signature has variable conditions. Some superiors explain
that they “read all the decisions”, and others, that they “trust” their own team
and don’t read their decisions. Others don’t read experienced caseworkers’ deci-
sions. The institutional capital of asylum caseworkers (experience, specialty, legal
training, responsibilities within the institution, etc.), their relationships with their
role (how they conceive of and play their role), as well as their superiors’, influ-
ence the conditions of the double signature.
How superiors perceive the caseworker influences his or her trust in the case-
worker him/herself. Conversely, caseworkers explained to me that they have to
“pick their battles” if they want to defend a positive decision (temporary admission
or asylum) in front of their superior, perceived as a “Hardliner”17 —which is the
image of the superior defending a strict policy implementation—or for a country for
which the institutional practice is restrictive. On the contrary, a caseworker explained
that she had not given any negative decision yet (DAWES or negative decision with-
out temporary admission) because she treated countries to which the secondary
implementation rules and the jurisprudence are particularly open, and because her
chief was considered as a “Softliner” (also called “Softy”)—which refers to people
characterized by some caseworkers as favoring a soft application of the law.
Thus, the combination of the country of origin, the institutional practice or
secondary implementation rules related to it, the institutional capital of
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caseworkers, their relationships with their role and those of their superiors influ-
ence the perception of the possibilities of having room for maneuver in favor of
the asylum seekers. Obviously, this positive use of such room for maneuver
depends on the moral subjectivity of the caseworkers too.
For Christophe, who was relatively “young” in the office at the time of the
interview, the various controls over his decisions lead him to a rigorous attitude
regarding the formalized secondary implementation rules. He speaks about the
actualization of these controls and about a call to order particularly visible in the
institution, which concerned one of his colleagues.
Jonathan:
Because, actually, are you controlled?
Christophe J.:
No, but our decisions are countersigned by our superior who will read the
decision and, of course, these temporary admissions or the positive decisions,
it’s of course more attentively controlled. And then, you really have to have
solid arguments, especially to give asylum.
Jonathan:
And only your superiors control you?
Christophe J.:
The superior and, for asylum, the Federf€uhrung18 [he refers to the people who
are responsible of establishing the secondary implementation rule for the
country]. . . For instance, for [African country X],19 we are. But it’s clear that,
after that, countries for which we easily give asylum, like. . . [two other African
countries, Y and Z], I think that’s enough to be controlled by our direct
superior. But it’s clear that for [country X], it’s clear that they will want to
know why, because there are statistics, which will tell that a [citizen of country
X] has received asylum. They will really want to deeply control the file then. I
don’t see myself. . . even if I find that there is credibility/plausibility, giving
asylum. . . In other countries, he could have asylum. . . Just because it’s
[country X], we won’t give asylum, because we have the stereotype that they
come in Switzerland for drug trafficking or to deal, and because it’s
economical motives, thus abuses in asylum. (. . .)
Jonathan:
Because you have directives about it? For instance, for [country X] or others?
Christophe J.:
Yes, and then, I don’t know, for example, one time, there was a colleague who
gave asylum to someone from [another African country, W], which made a big
noise in the office and the person undermined her credibility, and was called
to order by the superiors. (Interview with Christophe J., February 2011,
translated from French)
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This interview with Christophe J. shows different things. First, it shows how,
in a culture of suspicion and disbelief, negative decisions are easier to make than
positive ones. Whether there are some rare countries for which secondary
implementation rules—which are based on an interpretation of the law or
jurisprudence, related to a specific country—are more open, for several countries
such as the country X, it seems more difficult to make a positive decision.
Christophe J. is relatively young in the office and makes anticipations of the
calls to order and sanctions he could be faced with, if he were to make a decision
that would be contrary to the institutional prescriptions. The example of his col-
league works as a “boogeyman” that hinders him from making a positive decision
without a very strong argumentation. He also makes choices grounded in his
expectations for a career in the administration. All these expectations play a role
in the internalization of the rules and expectations of the institution.
This case is interesting to mention because of the specific conditions under
which Christophe’s colleague made her decision. She was an experienced case-
worker with a high level of institutional and legal capital. Her position in the
institution allowed her not to be controlled by her superiors and to make impor-
tant argumentations in terms of law. She explained to me that her decision was
well-substantiated by law and that she finally justified it to her superiors and the
SEM hierarchy. She could lean on her legal skills and on a “legal hypertechnical”
argumentation to make them recognize that she was right. Her institutional capi-
tal and her position in the institution gave her significant room for maneuver
because her superiors trusted her (which they still do).
Thus, the position in the institution, as well as the legal and institutional sym-
bolic capital of a caseworker, can allow him or her to perceive a lesser or greater
room for maneuver. Obviously, the position in the institution depends also on
them having established skills and correspondence with the expectations and the
logic of the institution.
Stefan M. is 31 years old and has a degree in law. He also speaks about this
possible use of the room for maneuver via a solid legal argumentation:
Stefan M. makes comments after a second interview that I observed. He
disserts about his work in the SEM and the room for maneuver he can
have:
(. . .) So if you make a DAWES, in general, it will easily pass.20 To the con-
trary, on a simple case, if you decide on the merits, that’s to say a decision
with an appeal delay that is longer, and maybe the case was more com-
plex, you have to argue, because the superior will read it and say: “but,
well, why do you do that? Why don’t you give a DAWES?” And then,
it’s there that you can use your argumentation and your room for maneu-
ver. (. . .) (Interview with Stefan M., October 2011, translated from French)
But if such argumentation can sometimes be used, like Stefan M. says, case-
workers who would like to make more positive decisions have to “pick their
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battles”. Corinna B. explains that she is considered as a Softliner and that her
superiors consider her to be na€ıve. Thus, she has to choose which cases she really
wants to defend in order to increase the odds of some of them passing. Here, her
reputation as a Softliner is positioned against her because her superiors read more
her decisions and accept fewer of her propositions of positive decisions.
Institutional and legal capitals
The following case I would like to mention is the one of Sylvie F. Her exam-
ple is also interesting to mention because it shows how the institutional symbolic
capital21 allows perceiving room for maneuver, and how this perception can
evolve over time, improving one’s institutional symbolic capital. In Sylvie’s exam-
ple, her experience and legal skills as well as the trust she had from her superior
—which is certainly related to her experience, responsibilities, and skills—allows
her today to consider herself as having a greater room for maneuver in her deci-
sions than when she was considered a beginner. In her conversation with me she
recalls that when she first started in the SEM, she took a negative decision for an
asylum seeker to whom she would have liked to give at least a temporary admis-
sion. She explains this negative decision by saying that she had to prove herself in
her new job. Moreover, her superior at that time could be considered as a Hard-
liner and pushed her to make negative decisions. On the contrary, she explains
that now, with her position, she could have made another decision.
Sylvie F.:
Finally, I regret a little, because it was at my beginnings, I did a negative
decision. I was still really. . .. Let’s say that when you begin at the office,
you’re. . . not under pressure, but. . . you have not the same room for maneuver
than the one I have now. Now I sign alone my decisions, I am completely . . .
So, at that time, I hadn’t the same liberty to give him another decision
(Interview with Sylvie F., January 2011)
One can see that the change of her status and the growing institutional sym-
bolic capital within SEM changed Sylvie F. perception of what decisions are possi-
ble in a given situation. It is also related to the growing liberty that she benefits in
her job because of the trust of her superiors. While, at her beginnings, she had to
prove herself, she did not conceive as possible to make another decision than
a negative one for this asylum seeker who came from a country for which the
secondary implementation rules were restrictive.
Jonathan:
And you talked about the room for maneuver that you hadn’t at the
beginning. How’s that? I don’t see. . .
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Sylvie F.:
Let’s be truthful. When you make negative decisions, you’re never controlled.
Never. The negative decisions are always welcome at the office in a sense.
That’s. . . unfortunate, but it’s really like the mentality of the office. On the
contrary, when you make a temporary admission decision, and even more for
an asylum decision, you have to make a proposition of decision. This
proposition is then accepted or not by your superior. And when you are at
your beginnings, that’s more difficult to impose yourself than when you have
already some years of experience and some practice behind you. So, I
remember that for this case, I would have liked to give him a temporary
admission, but. . . well I couldn’t. Now, the question wouldn’t be the same
anymore, that’s clear.
Jonathan:
Because now?
Sylvie F.:
Because now, I have the trust of my hierarchy, and I also have my place here.
And it would be really out of place for my superior tells me that my decision
is inappropriate. It’s something that I wouldn’t accept; as I would have myself
conducted the interview. So now, let’s say that there is no control or pressure.
(. . .) But it depends on the style of the superior. Before, I had a superior that
really was a Neinsager. (Interview with Sylvie F., January 2011, translated from
French)
Sylvie F. situates herself as being politically left-oriented in the institution22 in
comparison with her colleagues in the office. She opposes her political sensitivities
to the ones of those she calls Neinsagers or Hardliners. She explains that she pro-
cesses many files, which have to be dealt with quickly, generally pertaining to
countries for which the institutional practice is predominantly negative. Her
example shows that not every caseworker in the SEM adheres to the whole line
defined by the office and can—under certain conditions and in differentiated
ways—have certain room for maneuver in their practices to act according to their
“moral subjectivity”.
Nevertheless, the use of this room for maneuver cannot be unlimited. Wan-
dering too often from the line prescribed by the institution can expose one to calls
to order as well as to the ostracism of the colleagues. That is what explained Clau-
dine L., 55 years old and in the SEM for more than 20 years, who refused to make
DAWES at the beginning. She told me during an interview that she finally
decided to make such decisions because she had to face reprimands of her col-
leagues who argued about the equality of treatment. The ostracism of the col-
leagues, the anticipation of calls to order, the measures of control, and the
consequences for a career in the administration23 and the legalist ethos, all con-
tribute to the conformity of the asylum caseworkers to the institutional prescrip-
tions. Through those examples, one can see that the use of discretion with regard
to a decision that is in conformity with the institutional expectations and
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prescriptions is usually less costly. The perception and the use of this room for
maneuver appear to be related to certain conditions, among which the institu-
tional symbolic capital of the SEM agent, his/her position in the institution, and
his/her relationship with his/her superiors are particularly important.
Finally, the institutional socialization—such as trainings, learning by doing
(under the supervision of experienced colleagues), the relationships with one’s col-
leagues, the need to prove oneself—as well as the selection, during recruitment, and
the self-selection of employees (Oberfield, 2012) also contribute to a certain confor-
mity within a given institution. During the process of institutional socialization,
caseworkers internalize institutional categories of thinking and ways of working,
which guide their perceptions of the cases. Hence, a discourse that runs through the
different interviews and discussions with asylum caseworkers is that of a certain
“feeling” developed about lies. “When someone lie, you can feel it”. Recently, a
young asylum caseworker I spoke with told that, at the beginning, he trusted every
asylum seekers and that, now he has some practice, he knows when someone lies or
not. This internalization of what makes a story credible/plausible for the institution
versus what makes a story a lie is an example of the institutional socialization,
which shapes and frames the caseworkers’ perceptions and behaviors.
Conclusion
If the cases I presented above are examples of people who act against the
hard line of the office, the general norm seems to be conformity with this line. In
my analysis, I show there is room for maneuver for the caseworkers, but that it
can vary according to their position in the institution, their institutional symbolic
capital, their superiors, their colleagues, and the countries from which the asylum
pleas they process originate. The institutional socialization also acts to guide the
caseworkers’ perceptions and behaviors. Thus, I tried here to show that, while
there is room for maneuver and (procedural) discretion for asylum caseworkers,
there is also an important legal and social apparatus for directing the practices of
the agents. The institution frames and constraints structure the work of legal qual-
ification, investigation, and decision making pertaining to the asylum pleas.
Sociology of law and street-level bureaucracy studies have stated time and
again, with reason, that bureaucrats and judges have room for maneuver or discre-
tion during their interpretation of the law and its implementation. Research has
highlighted the power of the jurists, judges, and bureaucrats to “say the law”. Pierre
Bourdieu proposed a binary opposition between “droit et passe-droit” (law and favor)
(Bourdieu, 1990), while others juxtaposed discretion and rule-following or continua-
tion of the discretion as curtailment of rule-following. In response to Pierre Bour-
dieu, Pierre Lascoumes and Jean-Pierre Le Bourhis talked about “passes du droit”24
(Lascoumes & Le Bourhis, 1996) to highlight that law allows a space for interpreta-
tion and that law offers “passes” to act with the law, but within the law.
In this article, I tackled the issue of discretion beyond a “discretion/rule-fol-
lowing” or “discretion/law” binary. To me, the existence of room for maneuver is
inherent to the interpretation and implementation of the law and to the legal
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work. I showed that discretion and room for maneuver should be analyzed
through their conditions of possibility and with attention to the fact that their per-
ception is also socially determined.
I also tried to tackle the issue of discretion differently. I argued that if case-
workers have discretion and room for maneuver under certain conditions, it is
also interesting to analyze what can explain conformity within the institution. The
force of institutional socialization and internalization of the institutional prescrip-
tions and expectations can be related to the ways people sometimes act “as they
ought”, as institutions sometimes think (Douglas, 1986) and even feel (Fassin
et al., 2015) for them.
Notes
1. All the names of the people encountered during my fieldwork have been changed.
2. This kind of negative decisions has been abrogated in 2014. It is known in French as “decision de
non-entree en matiere” (NEM) and in German as “Nichteintretenentscheid” (NEE). For different rea-
sons, which were enumerated in the articles 32 to 35 of the Asylum Act, the caseworker could
decide to dismiss the application without entering into the substance of the case. This opened a
shorter appeal deadline: 5 days (while it is of 30 days for an “ordinary” decision examining the
substance of the case).
3. Hawkins quotes Denis Galligan (1986).
4. During my fieldwork, the SEM was called Federal Office for Migrations (FOM). The name changed
in 2015. Because of that, in this paper, I sometimes use the word “office” to refer to the SEM.
5. Through these observations and interviews, I could reach 10 different legal assistance services for
migrants (located in eight different cantons) and two private law offices in Switzerland. This was
important because while the asylum procedure is a federal competence, the legal assistance services
for asylum seekers are organized within the cantons.
6. The hearings and the answers the asylum seeker brings to the questions of the SEM agent consti-
tute generally the main (or even the only) element of proof on which the state employee has to
base him/herself for his/her decision. The asylum seeker thus has to make credible his/her own
story and his/her motives during the hearing(s).
7. In French, these decisions are called “decision de non-entree en matiere” (NEM) and, in German,
“Nichteintretenentscheid” (NEE). For different reasons, which were enumerated in the articles 32 to
35 of the Asylum Act, the caseworker could decide to dismiss the application without engaging
with the substance of the case. This opened a shorter appeal deadline: 5 days (while it is of 30 days
for an “ordinary” decision examining the substance of the case). This kind of negative decisions
has been abrogated in 2014. A revision of the Asylum Act adopted by the Parliament in December
the 14th 2012 abrogated the articles 32 to 35 of the Asylum Act, which ruled the motives of
DAWES. During my fieldwork, these decisions were possible and represented around 15% of the
decisions that were made.
8. The enforcement of removal is not possible if there are “technical” motives or circumstances that
prevent the return.
9. According to the law, the enforcement of removal is not permitted if it is contrary to Switzerland’s
obligations under international law. In French, the term that is used is “illicite”, and in German it is
“nicht zul€assig”.
10. According to the law, the unreasonableness is related to humanitarian reasons. In French, the term
that is used is “exigible”, and in German it is “unzumutbar”. The enforcement of removal may be
unreasonable if the asylum seeker is endangered by the situation prevailing in the country of origin
(civil war, war, general violence). The unreasonableness of the enforcement of removal order may also
concern “vulnerable persons” and people with medical grounds (see: Fassin, 2010; D’Halluin, 2016).
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11. 2009 is the year when the Dublin Agreement became effective in Switzerland.
12. In an interview, Georg Stutz, a director of division explained to me their decision: “Once, I said:
we’ll empty the beds [“on va vider les lits”]. Now we do all we can do to expulse them [”renvoyer”].
Like that, people leave and it frees the beds that we extremely need. [. . .] It’s not worth it if we
make decisions and if we cannot expulse. People are still here. [. . .]” (Interview with Georg Stutz,
July 2012) (fictional name).
13. It has to be specified that this section is based more on what agents state—meaning, on what they
say about what they do—than actual observation of what they do. Indeed, the fact that they say
that they only strictly “apply” the law does not mean that they act as strictly as they state it. The
“juridism of position” is above all else a discourse and a statement of asylum caseworkers.
14. My analysis is closely related to these articles, from which I started my reflection about discretion.
15. According to Didier Fassin, “moral subjectivities refer to processes by which individuals develop
ethical practices in their relationships with themselves or others. They attest to the autonomy and
freedom of agents, notably within contexts in which opposing values can come into conflict, contra-
dictory sentiments can create tensions, or political injunctions can run counter to professional
ethos” (Fassin et al., 2015, p. 9).
16. “Moral economies represent the production, circulation and appropriation of values and affects
regarding a given social issue. Consequently, they characterize for a particular historical moment
and a specific social world the manner in which this issue is constituted through judgments and
sentiments that gradually come to define a sort of common sense and collective understanding of
the problem” (Fassin et al., 2015, p. 9).
17. I quote here the terms—Hardliner (or Neinsager) and Softliner—that are used by the caseworkers
themselves. These terms have a negative (or, at least, a caricature) meaning.
18. In German, “die Federf€uhrung haben” means to “have the lead”. Within the SEM, this term is used
in different ways. It refers, at the same time, to the specific “practice” of the office related to a
country of origin, to the responsibility of this practice, and to the person or the group of people
responsible for determining this practice.
19. In accordance with my agreement with the SEM, I am not allowed to give exact names of these
countries.
20. He use the French expression: “ca passera comme une lettre a la poste”.
21. I refer to the symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1994) specifically related to the institution.
22. She explained to me this point while tracing a line on a paper and placing herself at the left side,
close to the center of the line.
23. This analysis is also inspired by the work of Christopher Browning in his book Ordinary Men
(Browning, 1998).
24. The notion of “passes du droit” refers to the opportunities, resources and constraints that rules con-
tain. These opportunities give the actors internal passes to strategically play with and within the
rules.
References
Alpes, Jill, and Alexis Spire. 2014. “Dealing with Law in Migration Control: The Powers of Street-Level
Bureaucrats at French Consulates.” Social & Legal Studies 23 (2): 261–74.
Belorgey, Nicolas. 2012. “De L’ho^pital A l’Etat: Le Regard Ethnographique Au Chevet de L’action
Publique.” Gouvernement et Action Publique 2 (2): 9–40.
Bigo, Didier. 2002. “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease.”
Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 27: 63–92.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1987. “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field (Translated by
Richard Terdiman).” The Hastings Law Journal 38: 805–53.
—————. 1990. “Droit et Passe-Droit.” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 81 (1): 86–96.
Miaz: From the Law to the Decision: Policy Studies Journal 393
—————. 1994. 331 Raisons Pratiques: Sur La Theorie de L’action. Paris: Seuil.
Brodkin, Evelyn Z. 2011a. “Policy Work: Street-Level Organizations Under New Managerialism.”
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21 (Supplement 2): 253–77.
—————. 2011b. “Putting Street-Level Organizations First: New Directions for Social Policy and
Management Research.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21 (Supplement 2):
199–201.
Brodkin, Evelyn Z., and Malay Majmundar. 2010. “Administrative Exclusion: Organizations and the
Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 20: 827–48.
Browning, Christopher R. 1998. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in
Poland. Reissued. New York, NY: Harper Perennial.
Buffat, Aurelien. 2015. “When and Why Discretion Is Weak or Strong: The Case of Taxing Officers in a
Public Unemployment Fund.” In Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy, eds. Peter Hupe, Michael
Hill, and Aurelien Buffat. Bristol: Policy Press, 79–96.
Byland, Karin, and Frederic Varone. 2012. “Judiciarisation de L’action Publique En Suisse: Analyse Du
Contentieux Administratif Au Tribunal Federal.” Revue Suisse de Science Politique 18 (1): 78–100.
Darley, Mathilde. 2010. “Le Pouvoir de La Norme. La Production Du Jugement et Son Contournement
Dans Les Lieux D’enfermement Des Etrangers.” Deviance et Societe 34 (2): 229–39.
—————. 2014. “Les Coulisses de La Nation. Assignations Genrees et Racialisees Dans Les Pratiques
D’assistance Aux Etrangers En Situation Irreguliere.” Societes Contemporaines 94 (2): 19–40.
Delpeuch, Thierry, Laurence Dumoulin, and Claire De Galembert. 2014 Sociologie Du Droit et de La
Justice. Paris: Armand Colin.
D’Halluin, Estelle. 2016. “Le Nouveau Paradigme Des ‘populations Vulnerables’ dans Les Politiques
Europeennes D’asile.” Savoir/Agir 2 (36): 21–6.
Douglas, Mary. 1986 How Institutions Think, 1st ed. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Dubois, Vincent. 2005. “L’insecurite Juridique Des Contro^leurs Des CAF. Une Perspective
Sociologique.” Informations Sociales 126: 46–57.
—————. 2009a. “Le Paradoxe Du Contro^leur. Incertitude et Contrainte Institutionnelle Dans Le
Contro^le Des Assistes Sociaux.” Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 178 (3): 28–49.
—————. 2009b. “Towards a Critical Policy Ethnography. The ‘Undeserving Poor’ and the New Welfare
State.” Critical Policy Studies 3 (2): 219–37.
—————. 2010 The Bureaucrat and the Poor: Encounters in French Welfare Offices. Surrey, Burlington:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
—————. 2015. “Doing Critical Policy Ethnography.” In Handbook of Critical Policy Studies, ed. Frank
Fischer, Douglas Torgerson, Anna Durnova, and Michael Orsini. Cheltenham-Northampton:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 462–80.
Dubois, Vincent, Delphine Dulong, Francois Buton, and Luc Chambolle. 2003. “Les Conditions Socio-
Politiques de La Rigueur Juridique.” Dossier d’etudes. Allocations Familiales (48), 1–142.
Dworkin, Ronald M. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Eule, Tobias G. 2014. Inside Immigration Law. Migration Management and Policy Application in Germany.
Surrey, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Evans, Tony, and John Harris. 2004. “Street-Level Bureaucracy, Social Work and the (Exaggerated)
Death of Discretion.” British Journal of Social Work 34: 871–95.
Fassin, Didier. 2010. La Raison Humanitaire: Une Histoire Morale Du Temps Present. Paris: Gallimard :
Seuil.
—————. 2013. “The Precarious Truth of Asylum.” Public Culture 25 (1): 39–63.
Fassin, Didier, Yasmine Bouagga, Isabelle Coutant, Jean-Sebastien Eideliman, Fabrice Fernandez,
Nicolas Fischer, Carolina Kobelinsky, Chowra Makaremi, Sarah Mazouz, and Sebastien Roux, eds.
2015. At the Heart of the State: The Moral World of Institutions. London: Pluto Press.
394 European Policy Analysis, 3:2
Fassin, Didier, and Carolina Kobelinsky. 2012. “How Asylum Claims Are Adjudicated: The Institution
as a Moral Agent.” Revue Francaise de Sociologie 53 (4): 657.
Fresia, Marion, David Bozzini, and Alice Sala. 2013. Les Rouages de L’asile En Suisse. Regards
Ethnographiques Sur Une Procedure Administrative. Neucha^tel: Swiss Forum for Migration and
Population Studies.
Gill, Nick. 2016. Nothing Personal?: Geographies of Governing and Activism in the British Asylum System.
Chichester, UK ; Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons.
Good, Anthony. 2007. Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York,
NY: Routledge-Cavendish.
Hawkins, Keith. 1992. “The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and Social Science.” In The
Uses of Discretion, Oxford socio-legal studies, ed. Keith Hawkins. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 11–46.
Hunt, Alan. 1993. Explorations in Law and Society. Toward a Constitutive Theory of Law. New York:
Routledge.
Hupe, Peter. 2013. “Dimensions of Discretion: Specifying the Object of Street-Level Bureaucracy
Research.” der moderne staat - Zeitschrift f€ur Public Policy, Recht und Management 6(2): 425–40.
Hupe, Peter, Michael Hill, and Aurelien Buffat, eds. 2015. Understanding Street-Level Bureaucracy.
Bristol: Policy Press.
Infantino, Federica, and Andrea Rea. 2012. “La Mobilisation D’un Savoir Pratique Local: Attribution
Des Visas Schengen Au Consulat General de Belgique A Casablanca.” Sociologies Pratiques 24 (1):
67–78.
Jubany, Olga. 2011. “Constructing Truths in a Culture of Disbelief: Understanding Asylum Screening
from within.” International Sociology 26 (1): 74–94.
Kelly, Tobias. 2012. “Sympathy and Suspicion: Torture, Asylum, and Humanity.” Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 18: 753–68.
Kobelinsky, Carolina. 2013. “Enque^te de Verite. La Production Des Decisions Pour Les Demandes
D’asile.” In Juger, Reprimer, Accompagner. Essai Sur La Morale de l’Etat, eds. Didier Fassin, Yasmine,
Bouagga, Isabelle, Coutant, Jean-Sebastien, Eideliman, Fabrice, Fernandez, Nicolas, Fischer,
Carolina, Kobelinsky, Chowra, Makaremi, Sarah, Mazouz, and Sebastien, Roux Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 101–33.
Lahusen, Christian, and Stephanie Schneider, eds. 2016. Asyl verwalten: zur b€urokratischen Bearbeitung
eines gesellschaftlichen Problems. 1. Aufl. Bielefeld: transcript.
Lascoumes, Pierre. 1990. “Normes juridiques et mise en œuvre des politiques publiques.” L’Annee
Sociologique 40: 43–71.
Lascoumes, Pierre, and Jean-Pierre Le Bourhis. 1996. “Des Passe-Droits Aux Passes Du Droit. La Mise
En Œuvre Socio-Juridique de L’action Publique.” Droit et Societe 32: 51–73.
Lascoumes, Pierre, and Jean-Pierre Le Bourhis. 1996. “Des Passe-Droits Aux Passes Du Droit. La Mise
En Œuvre Socio-Juridique de L’action Publique.” Droit et Societe 32: 51–73.
Lascoumes, Pierre, and Evelyne Serverin. 1988. “Le Droit Comme Activite Sociale: Pour Une Approche
Weberienne Des Activites Juridiques.” Droit et Societe 9: 171–93.
Lawrance, Benjamin N., and Galya Ruffer, eds. 2014. Adjudicating Refugee and Asylum Status: The Role of
Witness, Expertise, and Testimony. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lipsky, Michael. 1980. Streel-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation Publications.
—————. 2010. Street-Level Bureaucracy, 30th Ann. Ed.: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Service.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Mariot, Nicolas. 2012. “L’habitus du dehors: Questions sans reponse et presence des institutions.”
Politix 100 (4): 189–200.
Maynard-Moody, Steven, and Michael Musheno. 2003. Cops, Teachers, Counselors. Stories from the Front
Lines of Public Service. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Miaz: From the Law to the Decision: Policy Studies Journal 395
Miaz, Jonathan. 2014. “Les ‘persecutions Liees Au Genre’ en Suisse: Les Frontieres Du Droit D’asile En
Question.” Cahiers du Genre 2 (57): 55–75.
—————. 2017. “Politique D’asile et Sophistication Du Droit. Pratiques Administratives et Defense
Juridique Des Migrants En Suisse (1981-2015).” These de doctorat. Universite de Lausanne et
Universite de Strasbourg.
Oberfield, Zachary W. 2010. “Rule Following and Discretion at Government’s Frontlines: Continuity
and Change during Organization Socialization.” Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory 20 (4): 735–55.
—————. 2012. “Socialization and Self-Selection: How Police Officers Develop Their Views About Using
Force.” Administration & Society 44 (6): 702–30.
Oberfield, Zachary W. 2014. Becoming Bureaucrats: Socialization at the Front Lines of Government Services.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Parini, Lorena. 1997. La Politique D’asile En Suisse: Une Perspective Systemique. Paris: L’Harmattan.
Parini, Lorena, and Matteo Gianni. 2005. “Enjeux et Modifications de La Politique D’asile En Suisse de
1956 A Nos Jours.” In Histoire de La Politique de Migration, D’asile et D’integration En Suisse Depuis
1948, ed. Hans Mahnig. Zurich: Editions Seismo, 189–252.
Piguet, Etienne. 2009. L’immigration En Suisse: Soixante Ans D’entrouverture. Lausanne: Presses
polytechniques universitaires romandes.
Pratt, Anna C. 1999. “Dunking the Doughnut: Discretionary Power, Law and the Administration of the
Canadian Immigration Act.” Social & Legal Studies 8 (2): 199–226.
Probst, Johanna. 2011. “Entre Faits et Fiction: L’instruction de La Demande D’asile En Allemagne et En
France.” Cultures & Conflits 84: 63–80.
—————. 2012. “Instruire La Demande D’asile. Etude Comparative Du Processus Decisionnel Au Sein de
L’administration Allemande et Francaise.” Doctorat en sociologie. Universite de Strasbourg et
Philipps-Universit€at Marburg.
Schatz, Edward. 2009. Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power. Chicago:
University Of Chicago Press.
Schoenholtz, Andrew I., Philip G. Schrag, and Jaya Ramji-Nogales. 2014. Lives in the Balance: Asylum
Adjudication by the Department of Homeland Security. New York: New York University Press.
Smith, Steven Rathgeb. 2003. “Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Policy.” In Handbook of Public
Administration, ed. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre. London: Sage, 354–65.
Souter, James. 2011. “A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee Status Determination in the
United Kingdom.” Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration 1 (1): 48–59.
Spire, Alexis. 2005. Etrangers A La Carte. L’administration de L’immigration En France (1945-1975). Paris:
Editions Grasset & Fasquelle.
Tafelmacher, Christophe. 2013. “Du Droit D’asile A La Gestion Du Stock Humain Ou Comment
Reduire A Neant L’hospitalite et Les Droits.” Vivre Ensemble Hors-serie 3.
Tanquerel, Thierry, Frederic Varone, Arun Bolkensteyn, and Karin Byland. 2011 Le Contentieux
Administratif En Suisse: Une Analyse Empirique. Geneve: Schulthess.
Thomas, Robert. 2011. Administrative Justice and Asylum Appeals: A Study of Tribunal Adjudication.
Oxford ; Portland, OR: Hart.
Voutat, Bernard. 2009. “Le Droit A L’epreuve de La Sociologie.” Plaidoyer 1: 58–63.
Watkins-Hayes, Celeste. 2009. The New Welfare Bureaucrats. Entanglements of Race, Class, and Policy
Reform. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
396 European Policy Analysis, 3:2
